Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Compositionality, linguistics, language philosophy: the thesis (originally by G. Frege, Grundlagen der Arithmetik, 1884) that the meaning of composite expressions, e.g. sentences, results from the meanings of the parts. It follows that a change of the parts, e.g. replacement of a single word by another, can change the meaning of the entire composite structure. See also Frege principle._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Steven E. Boer on Compositionality - Dictionary of Arguments
I XVII Compositional semantics/belief-attribution/Boer: thesis: the compositional semantics should not explain the logical oddity of belief attribution as a pragmatic illusion (as Boer and Lycan attempted in 1980)(1) but accept and explain it. (BoerVsBoer, self-criticism). 1. Boer, St. & Lycan, W.G. "Who? Me?" In: The Philosophical Review 89:427-66._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986 |
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> Counter arguments against Boer
> Counter arguments in relation to Compositionality
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28